




How is the War on Terror to be understood in light of the final defeat of Western
troops in Afghanistan, almost 20 years to the day since 9/11? One standard reading
is that the lack of accountability for Western crimes reinforces the exceptional status
that Western states hold in international law. Yet this de facto status is not fixed
and cannot be passively enjoyed. It requires instead an active management of both
domestic and international pressures for accountability that follow apparent violations
of international law.
These modes of management are dynamic responses, resulting from interactions
with a diverse range of domestic, international and non-state actors. Understanding
this complexity is a way of identifying where exceptionalism should be contested, as
well as how less powerful states may adopt similar strategies for similar benefits. In
what follows, I reflect on the techniques of accountability management relied upon by
three Western states in response to allegations of international crimes, primarily in
Afghanistan, and tentatively identify the implications of such practices.
These allies with similar domestic legal cultures – the United Kingdom, United
States, and Canada – approached the question of avoidance of responsibility for
crimes in Afghanistan in distinct but overlapping ways. Two of these states are
obvious choices of study for their central role in the War(s) on Terror, and being
directly implicated in huge numbers of alleged crimes. The third, Canada, is relevant
because of the comparatively blunt strategy it uses to attain the same ends. All three
were integral to the establishment of the rules of the International Criminal Court
(ICC), the institution that grew alongside the War on Terror and which now poses the
most serious (if not especially potent) threat to that exceptional status.
Examining how these states approach and develop their exceptional status
with respect to allegations of international crimes shows that states pursue
‘exceptionalism’ and its benefits through a variety of strategies. Given the relative
standing and power of these states internationally, the risks posed by their tactics
may disproportionately burden international institutions and norms rather than the
states themselves. In the realm of international criminal law, the willingness of
international institutions, such as the ICC, to tolerate or accept these approaches will
strengthen criticisms that these actors have reconciled themselves to the existence




American exceptionalism in regards to accountability for Afghanistan has taken
three primary forms. One is outright denial of the commission of any crimes falling
within the jurisdiction of the ICC. This denial has extended across US presidential
administrations, including the Biden regime, which continues to insist on the total
lack of ICC jurisdiction over US personnel. Even the recent admission that a US
drone strike killed only civilians (among them up to 7 children), and no ISIS-K forces,
has led to no legal response, just as the Obama-era admission of torture led to a
suppressed investigation into the scale and severity of the abuses and no criminal
prosecutions (in spite of a good deal of ‘trying’).
Yet as acknowledged by the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) itself, US authorities
have engaged in some investigations, taking some theoretical steps towards
meeting complementarity requirements (even as experts disagree on whether this
is satisfactory or not, and evidence suggests that key information was kept from
Congress).
These gestures towards complementarity disrupt the paradigm of exceptionalism
by suggesting some alignment between US practices and ICC rules, even if these
investigations have not been presented to the OTP as such. More pointedly, they are
evidence of a desire to engage in normative reconstruction of the ICC in a way that
better fits US policy, alongside other stricter rejections of ICC jurisdiction.
The argument that complementarity has been satisfied is not one put forward by
the state, but by other observers. Most interesting here is the suggestion from the
American Society of International Law’s ICC Task Force that the United States
engage in renegotiation of the terms of ICC engagement, in order to better fit US
priorities. This includes modifying the complementarity standard in a way that better
accords with US interests and practices. It also includes pushing the Court to move
away from the “situation-as-a-whole” principle. In other words, to formally permit
the OTP to only engage in limited investigations of some parties to a conflict. This
would especially benefit the US because it is involved in more conflicts than any
other state and risks being “enmeshed in an investigation based on the conduct of
other parties”. This assumes, of course, that US crimes are not as common or grave
as those of other states or military actors, and comes close to suggesting that the
more widespread a military’s activities and crimes are, the less accountable it ought
to be for its actions. Legally sanctioning partial investigations also clearly ignores
the serious legitimacy deficit faced by the Court, all in the name of pandering to US
exceptionalism.
The third and most notorious mode of accountability avoidance has been the
leveraging of US legal power against the ICC. Threats of and actual sanctions
against ICC officials and others who support the Court have been aimed at deterring
investigations of US soldiers and commanders. While this Trump-era Executive
Order sanctioning ICC officials was revoked by President Biden in April 2021,
it is a more refined use of power. Rather than just ignoring the Rome Statute
and its provisions on complementarity, the US crafted laws intended to influence
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the discretionary decision-making of the OTP and other supporters of the Court.
Ultimately, these approaches seem to have worked: the new Chief Prosecutor of the
Court recently announced his office’s intention to ‘deprioritise’ investigations into the
United States and its allies in the Afghani national forces.
British Lawfare
Where the US has simply avoided the question of complementary domestic
prosecutions as part of a larger strategy of jurisdictional denial, the UK has gone
a different route. One approach has been to modify international norms by legally
insulating soldiers from domestic prosecution. Royal Assent was recently granted
to a bill that places a five-year statute of limitations on prosecutions for international
crimes, and legislates a “presumption against prosecution” of British soldiers
engaged in overseas military activities. These shifts affect modern understandings
of both the seriousness of international crimes, as well as the burden to be met by
prosecutors.
The new law effectively precludes domestic prosecutions for British crimes in either
Afghanistan or Iraq, leaving the ICC as the only realistic site of accountability. While
the OTP is not officially investigating British crimes in Afghanistan, it has not ruled
out the possibility. The intermingled nature of military operations suggests such
evidence may yet be uncovered (especially as evidence of a pattern of suspicious
killings by the SAS has emerged).
This leads to the second avoidance approach: promoting complementarity efforts to
show the ICC has no role to play. As a State Party to the ICC, the UK faces different
pressure to comply with the Court’s norms and rules than the US. Yet those norms
privilege complementarity mechanisms that mirror the Court’s own approach to
specific cases, as well as those states with ‘significant resources’ that use them
for „framing and directing legal processes so as to prolong or otherwise frustrate
the pursuit of accountability”. In respect to allegations of crimes in Iraq, the UK
clearly sought to avoid international responsibility by engaging in a complementarity
process (see Paras 117 – 120 here), albeit one that was directed at exoneration and
stymying the OTP, rather than true accountability.
A similar complementarity process was developed to respond to allegations
from Afghanistan. Operation Northmoor investigated 675 allegations from 159
complainants. Those investigations were formally concluded in June 2020, without
any resulting prosecutions, even as evidence that information was withheld from the
inquiry came to light.
Northmoor was arguably part of an ongoing strategy of avoidance reliant on
institutional design, and it places the OTP in a difficult position. While the OTP
has not ruled out investigating British crimes in Afghanistan, it is constrained
by the findings of Operation Northmoor and its own prior determination on the
inadmissibility of allegations of British crimes in Iraq. In that situation, the OTP found
that while there was a ‘reasonable basis to believe’ war crimes were committed,
it could not say there was a lack of genuineness to domestic proceedings (and
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therefore that it could not investigate the allegations), notwithstanding that a decade-
long domestic investigation produced no prosecutions. Given the facial comparability
of the domestic ‘investigations’, there is reason to believe the OTP will find that
the British strategy of delay, inadequate investigation, and non-prosecution again
satisfies complementarity requirements.
Canadian Obstinance
In contrast to the approaches of its allies, Canada has adopted a hard line of
denialism and suppression. While the US and UK have mixed gestures towards
genuine investigations with other more stringent means of precluding accountability
that are at least attentive to the risk of ICC investigation and prosecution, Canada
has simply filibustered when presented with allegations that its troops were complicit
in crimes in Afghanistan.
These allegations rest primarily on the relationship between the Canadian Armed
Forces (CAF) and the Afghan National Directorate of Security (NDS). Canadian
diplomat Richard Colvin, who served in Afghanistan for 17 months, testified to
a parliamentary committee in 2009 that “the likelihood is that all the Afghans we
handed over [to the NDS] were tortured”; this included being “beaten, subjected
to electric shocks, denied sleep, and raped or otherwise sexually abused.” Colvin
had reported this information to superiors in May 2006, was warned off, and then
threatened with legal action. A former Afghan interpreter for the CAF’s intelligence
unit testified that the CAF “used the NDS as a subcontractor for abuse and torture”.
In response to Colvin’s testimony, opposition parties called for the government to
release all documents on detainee abuses. Parliament was instead prorogued for an
election, and ultimately only 4,000 of the estimated 40,000 documents were released
in heavily redacted form. One year later, the inquiry was simply closed.
Changes in government and additional allegations have not altered the pattern of
denialism and non-investigation: there were “no concerns raised” about Canadian
participation in missions with Australian special forces later accused of war crimes;
Canadian troops refused to cooperate with investigators in respect of abuse
allegations; and, there is no need for an independent inquiry, according to the
current Defence Minister (who himself served in the CAF’s intelligence unit in
Afghanistan).
Implications of Exceptionalist Practices
This survey of practices in relation to the War on Terror reveals that the relatively
capacious label of exceptionalism captures a wide range of conduct, and that states
often pursue exceptionalist protection on multiple tracks simultaneously. The first
way in which this happens is through the obvious forms of denialism, threats and
obstruction that all states are capable of engaging in.
At least two other relevant observations lie beyond this straightforward blunt-force
approach. Importantly, exceptionalism is interactive, responsive to both international
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and domestic influences. Domestic pressure can emanate from civil society as well
as within the government or military. This can prompt changes in domestic law in
order to preclude findings of international law violations. It can also lead to not just
contestation with non-state actors, but an alignment of interests. In the US, that
alignment is aimed at a normative engagement with the ICC, toward the goal of
concretizing the exceptional status of the US.
Relatedly, exceptionalism in the context of international crimes frequently relies on
two sites of flexibility in the ICC admissibility regime. First, accountability avoidance
can flow from complementarity obfuscation: the performance of genuine proceedings
as demonstrated by the breadth of investigations that are also shallow by design.
Second, Western states seek to exploit the gravity threshold by minimizing the
seriousness of allegations. This is done either by modifying the tu quoque argument
to point at the comparable gravity of acts of other parties to a conflict, or suppressing
relevant information that would reveal the true scale and severity of Western acts.
Both of these minimization tactics are available to (and have been practiced by) non-
Western states and non-state parties to conflicts, but states with more robust legal
systems may also start to scale up their complementarity efforts in pursuit of the
volume-based, bureaucratic negation of international jurisdiction that the US and UK
have modeled.
Ultimately, however, the success or propriety of these modes of avoidance is
determined in part by the toleration and interpretation of domestic processes
by international agents such as the OTP. Regardless of whether the ICC is as
tolerant of non-Western states engaging in similar projects, it faces a serious
legitimacy threat: either it will demonstrate its tacit acceptance of double-standards in
international law, or it will be accused of failing to protect the victims of atrocities.
The powerful Western state that is exceptional in (or even exempted from parts of)
international law is not a fixed category but an evolving one. This ongoing evolution
means exceptionalism can be both pursued and challenged at multiple sites. This in
turn suggests that while powerful states may disproportionately enjoy the benefits of
exceptionalism, other states can apply some of the same tactics for similar benefits.
With respect to the ICC, non-Western states have traditionally relied upon more
direct forms of obstruction, including non-cooperation and threatening ICC officials.
Witness interference also appears problematic. While charges of interference have
only been laid in respect of two ICC cases, credible allegations of interference –
which require some degree of coordination that could plausibly emanate from states
or parties to conflicts – have been raised in many more.
Interestingly, some efforts at excepting non-Western states from the application of
the Rome Statute have taken the form of collective efforts to rely on legal arguments.
The repeated non-arrest of Omar al-Bashir by multiple States Parties was part
of a larger debate about immunities, non-State Parties, and the powers of the
Security Council (itself an incubator for ‘exceptional’ states). As well, the attempts
to have the investigation into Sudan deferred was the product of an African Union
request to the Security Council to act under Article 16 of the Rome Statute. While
these approaches may lack some of the ulterior motives present in other strategies
outlined above, it is telling that they rely on collective legal argumentation rather
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than the individualized approaches of the US, UK and Canada. This suggests a
recognition on the part of some states that they do not have the requisite status or
resources to act alone.
What this survey overall suggests is that Western exceptionalism might lie not in the
fact of non-applicability of international law, but in the consistent enjoyment of non-
applicability or reduced burdens. A hidden cost of the War on Terror may therefore
be that international norms and institutions that Western states otherwise promote
are diminished through both the direct practices of those states as well as their
legitimation and further dispersal of tactics of avoidance.
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